13.
The text of the law is accompanied, inter alia , by a number of annexed tables providing a breakdown of the budgetary information (income, expenditure, financing, etc.) according to the organization of the national administration and its decentralized bodies. The tax revenue forecast is broken down according to the different taxes (IG, IVA, Personal Property Tax, etc.) and set out in detail in the Executive's annual letter of submission to the National Congress.
14. The projected amounts are then incorporated in the final estimate of income that is ultimately approved by Congress. The specification of these amounts, once they are included in the budget, forms part of the Law and make up the estimate of income for the entire financial year; in other words, they can only be amended by another law, since any change would involve a consequential change in the expenditure/income equation and the deficit level already approved.
15.
Argentina further explains that, at the same time, the tax system is tied to the Law on Fiscal
Solvency which provides, inter alia, for the progressive reduction of the national public deficit with a view to balancing the budget by 2005. This Law establishes target deficit levels for each year, and any change in the deficit levels indicated would also require a legislative amendment. Because of the relationship between the Law on Fiscal Solvency and the Budget Law, estimated income and expenditure will have to be adjusted in order to reduce the deficit to attain the target prescribed. The procedure will have to be applied by law in each of the succeeding financial years until the process is completed in 2005.
16.
The Law on Fiscal Solvency also lays down the obligation to include in the letter of submission of the annual budget a multi-year budget covering at least three years. In other words, the Executive must submit to the Congress, together with the budget for the coming year, a multi-year projection containing estimates of income on the basis of existing tax rates which means calculating the advances in the form of retenciones and percepciones needed in order to meet the objectives of the Law on Fiscal Solvency for 31 December 2004.
17.
As a result, in the view of Argentina, it is not possible to amend the budget currently in force without altering its deficit target as well as the deficit target of the Law on Fiscal Solvency. Nor is it possible, in the current situation, to alter the system of customs levies. That system is not only linked to imports, but is also part of a comprehensive scheme to combat tax evasion which includes levies on purchases in the domestic market and the retenciones regime. The system makes it possible to maintain better monitoring of the obligations of taxpayers while providing them with adequate incentives to declare and regularize their operations. 
25.
The European Communities submits that in order to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, Argentina must take one of the following actions: equalize the rates applied to imports and to internal sales (including the zero rates); and/or provide for the refund to the importers of the additional costs imposed by the higher rates on imports, or establish a similar compensation system. The above actions will require, respectively, amending the existing Resoluciones Generales or adopting new ones.
The European Communities observes that the adoption or amendment of a Resolución
General of the AFIP does not have to follow any pre-determined procedural steps, other than the prior consultation (intervención) of two administrative units of the AFIP. Nor are they subject to any deadlines, whether mandatory or voluntary. The Resoluciones Generales can be enacted or amended within a short time frame and, in practice, are issued very frequently. Only if it is "impracticable" to do so, is the Member concerned entitled to a "reasonable period of time" for implementation.
29.
The European Communities submits that the 15-month period mentioned in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU is a "guideline" for the arbitrator, and not an average, or usual period. As stated in
Australia -Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon
however, that the Arbitrator is obliged to grant 15 months in all cases." 7 According to the award in
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) ("European Communities -
Hormones"), the "reasonable period of time" should be "the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB". 8 Therefore, the when assessing the "reasonable period of time" the arbitrator must take into account the "interests" of Argentina as a developing country, this does not mean that the arbitrator must take into account "circumstances" which are "qualitatively different" from those that would be relevant for a developed country. Rather, the arbitrator must apply the same kind of criteria to developing as to developed countries, but bearing in mind the greater difficulties which might be encountered by Argentina as a developing country. 
35.
The European Communities asserts that the "reasonable period of time" proposed in its submission has been generously estimated so as to take into account the "interests" of Argentina as a developing country. Were Argentina a developed country, the "reasonable period of time" would have to be much shorter in the light of the above considerations.
36.
The European Communities, therefore, for its part, requests the arbitrator to rule that the reasonable period of time for Argentina to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case is eight months from the date of adoption by the DSB of the Panel report.
III. Reasonable Period of Time

37.
My task in this arbitration is to determine the "reasonable period of time", as that term is used 
40.
It is useful to go back to basics and perhaps most basic of all considerations is the nature of the act(s) of compliance or implementation that a WTO Member like Argentina, which has engaged in dispute resolution proceedings, is obliged to carry out. Implementation, in essence, consists of bringing the measure held to be inconsistent with the obligations of the WTO Member concerned under particular provisions of a particular covered agreement, into conformity with those same provisions. Article 3.7 of the DSU stresses that "the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure". (emphasis added)
The DSU goes on to state that compensation may be resorted to only if "the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and then only as "a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the
WTO-inconsistent measure." (emphasis added) Suspension of concessions or other obligations under
the covered agreements is explicitly designated as a "last resort" mode of compliance "subject to authorization by the DSB", but it too remains a "temporary" remedy allowed under Article 22.8 of the DSU only until the non-conforming measure is "removed" or a "mutually satisfactory solution" is achieved. Moreover, and at any rate, Article 22.1 of the DSU cautions that neither compensation nor suspension of concessions or other obligations is to be "preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements." Clearly, therefore, the non-conforming measure is to be brought into a state of conformity with specified treaty provisions either by withdrawing such measure completely, or by modifying it by excising or correcting the offending portion of the measure involved. Where the non-conforming measure is a statute, a repealing or amendatory statute is commonly needed. Where the measure involved is an administrative regulation, a new statute may or may not be necessary, but a repealing or amendatory regulation is commonly required.
14 13 The European Communities has, however, stated that such exclusion did not mean an admission that the measures already taken by Argentina constituted "adequate implementation" of the DSB recommendations and rulings. The European Communities reserved their right to request recourse to panel proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, should that become necessary. European Communities submission, para. 9.
14 The non-conforming measure might also assume other forms: e.g., an executive or administrative practice actually carried out but not specifically mandated or authorized by statute or administrative regulation; or a "quasi-judicial" determination by an administrative body. Since the Argentine measures involved in this arbitration are not of these kinds, it is not necessary to examine the requirements of compliance where those other kinds of measures are concerned. could "equalize" the advance or withholding payment rates with respect to imports and with respect to internal sales, or provide for the refund to importers of the additional costs entailed by the higher rates on imports or for a similar "compensation" scheme. Whether the curative or remedial action adopted provides for "equalization" of rates or for a refund or "compensation" arrangement, the European Communities states that no new Argentine legislation is required.
43.
The submissions of Argentina on this point are much more complex. Argentina seems to acknowledge that the Resoluciones Generales found to be WTO-inconsistent can be revoked or amended by another Resolución General that the AFIP is competent to issue, and that a new legislative enactment by the federal legislature is not, as a matter of public or administrative law, required for that specific purpose. At the oral hearing in this arbitration, Argentina confirmed this. the same time, however, Argentina underscores its deep concern that so revoking or modifying the Resoluciones Generales here involved would set in motion a whole series of financial and fiscal consequences which would, in turn, require it to amend its National Budget Law No. 25,401 and its Fiscal Solvency Law, No. 25,152. The inter-relation of these two statutes is such, in the submission of Argentina, that any modification of estimated tax revenues would involve multi-year (at least three years) changes in the specific requirements of both statutes and, as well, changes in the financial ratios and commitments set out in Argentina's present agreements with the IMF.
44.
Argentina contends that "equalizing" downwards -that is, lowering the rates of the advance or withholding tax payments on imports to the level of those imposed on internal sales -would result in significant reduction of the IVA and IG tax revenues actually realized. Such decrease in tax revenues would, Argentina maintains, substantially aggravate the current severe liquidity problems of the country. On the other hand, "equalizing" upwards -that is, raising the advances or withholding tax rates imposed on internal sales to the level of those prescribed in respect of imports, would increase the difficulties of controlling the economic recessionary trends the country is presently undergoing. Additionally, it is argued that for Argentina to reimburse importers for the additional costs incurred as a result of the higher advanced or withholding rates on imports would require not only new disbursements from the national treasury and thus affect the estimated level of deficit expenditures, but also the establishment of a complex administrative mechanism to ensure correct and fair reimbursements.
45.
Certain considerations need to be brought to mind in respect of the above submissions of Argentina. Firstly, Argentina is not arguing that it needs forty-six months to formulate, draft and put into effect one or more Resoluciones Generales to bring its existing WTO-inconsistent Resoluciones Generales into conformity with the requirements of Article III(2), first sentence, of the GATT 1994.
My understanding is that Argentina, in effect, is contending that it needs forty-six months to control and counter certain economic and financial consequences that it apprehends will follow from putting into legal effect an appropriate amendatory Resolución General , to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
46.
Secondly, the economic and social consequences of which Argentina is apprehensive, have not been demonstrated to be causally linked to adoption of an appropriate amendatory Resolución General in the course of these arbitration proceedings. 16 At least one of the consequences Argentina is anxious about, the decline in revenue collected, is demonstrably not linked to an amendatory
Resolución General that would, for instance, "equalize" downwards the advance or withholding tax rates on imports to the level imposed on internal sales. Since the final or true tax rates remain the same regardless of the level of advance or withholding rates, any decline in taxes actually collected will be directly attributable to the deficiencies of the revenue collection system in place and to the high levels of tax evasion said to be currently prevailing. Those deficiencies and levels of tax evasion have existed for some years now and certainly long before any amendatory Resolución General will have been adopted and put into effect.
47.
A third consideration is that there is nothing to prevent Argentina from enacting new legislation or administrative regulations, at the same time that an amendatory Resolución General is adopted or soon thereafter, designed, for instance, to strengthen further the existing revenue collection systems and create new incentives for improving voluntary tax compliance among particular sectors of the general community. At the oral hearing in this arbitration, Argentina noted that it already has laws providing for heavy penalties for tax evasion. The kinds of strategies that may be devised for the securing of such objectives are many and varied indeed, and it is the sovereign prerogative of
Argentina to determine what strategies are best suited given the actual conditions of the country. It should, however, be borne in mind that the compliance or implementation obligation owed by Argentina by reason of the DSB recommendations and rulings in Argentina -Hides and Leather, is not the comprehensive reform of its internal tax system or the elimination or minimization of tax evasion in the general Argentine community. That duty is, as earlier stressed, much more modest and specific in scope: to revoke or modify certain identified Resoluciones Generales so as to bring them into conformity with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994.
48.
A fourth consideration is that while formal adoption of an amendatory Resolución General may, as a theoretical matter, require less time than the enactment of a new statute, debate within the 16 The European Communities asserted that the submissions made by Argentina in these arbitration proceedings amount to an effort to re-open issues decided by the Panel in its Report. Argentina at the oral hearing disclaimed any intent to re-open issues decided in the Panel Report. I do not find it necessary to pass upon this particular question. It is clear, on the one hand, that an arbitrator functioning under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, in principle, lacks jurisdiction to re-open issues decided in a Panel Report which has become final and binding by reason of adoption by the DSB. On the other hand, making factual statements before a panel for the purpose of justifying a measure complained about as WTO-inconsistent need not, in principle, preclude a respondent Member from making the same or similar factual statements before an Article 21.3(c) arbitrator to sustain a claim that particular circumstances exist justifying grant of a certain period as a "reasonable period of time" for implementation purposes.
Argentine government about the most suitable policies to be embodied in the amendatory Resolución General may well involve some additional expenditure of time and administrative resources.
49.
A final point that should be made is that to build into the concept of a "reasonable period of time" to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings, time or opportunity to control and manage economic or social conditions which antedate or are contemporaneous with the adoption of the WTOinconsistent governmental measure, may, in the generality of instances, be to defer to an indefinitely receding future the duty of compliance. The implications for the multilateral trading system as we know it today, of such an interpretation of "reasonable period of time" for compliance are clear and far-reaching and ominous. Such an interpretation would tend to reduce the fundamental duty of "immediate" or "prompt" compliance to a figure of speech.
50.
Argentina also emphasizes that it is a developing country for purposes of Article 21.2 of the DSU. In Article 21.2, the DSU, immediately after stressing that "prompt compliance" with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is essential for the WTO dispute settlement system, provides that Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement.
51.
Argentina submits that its interests as a developing country Member whose measures have been subjected to dispute settlement proceedings, must be taken into account in determining a "reasonable period of time" for compliance. However, Argentina has not been very specific about how its interests as a developing country Member actually bear upon the duration of the "reasonable period of time" needed to put into legal effect an appropriate amendatory Resolución General.
Arguably, Argentina is assimilating its "interests" as a developing country Member with the severe economic and financial difficulties it is currently facing. Article 21.2 is cast in exceedingly general terms. Nevertheless, in the arbitral award in Chile -Alcoholic Beverages, it is said that "because Article 21.2 is in the DSU, it is not simply to be disregarded." The award goes on to say that "Article 21.2, whatever else it may signify, usefully enjoins, inter alia, an arbitrator functioning under Article 21.3(c) to be generally mindful of the great difficulties that a developing country
Member may, in a particular case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB." In Indonesia -Automobile Industry, the arbitrator took into consideration as "very particular circumstances" the status of Indonesia as a developing country and the fact that it was then "currently in a dire economic and financial situation" and its economy "near collapse". The arbitrator then accorded a substantial additional period over and above the "normal" period required for completion of Indonesia's domestic rule-making process. I agree that under Article 21.2 of the DSU
